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Abstract
For aquaculture to continue along its current growth trajectory and contribute
towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, value chains must become
more inclusive. Smallholders and other local value chain actors are often constrained
by circumstances and market failures in the global aquaculture industry. Integrating
these actors into aquaculture value chains through inclusive business models (IBMs)
is often touted as a solution to sustainable and ethical trade and business that can
generate development outcomes. We reviewed 36 papers under seven business mod-
els commonly used in agriculture development to assess their application in aquacul-
ture value chains in lower-income countries. A global value chain (GVC) analysis is
used to unpack the economic and social upgrading objectives of the different IBMs,
as well as the types of relational coordination used between actors in the chain to
achieve development outcomes. The extent to which these IBMs helped poor actors
overcome certain barriers is evaluated with a focus on how they may ensure or be a
risk to inclusiveness through the relations and upgrading opportunities evident in
their make-up. The analysis found that the majority of the models focused on eco-
nomic upgrading over social upgrading. Providing opportunities for the latter is key
to achieving the inclusive objectives of IBMs. Greater horizontal coordination
between actors can create further opportunities for economic upgrading established
under vertical coordination with other nodes upstream and downstream in a value
chain. There is a need to further contextualize these models to aquaculture systems
and develop clear indicators of inclusiveness.
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Introduction
Seafood1 is one of the most internationally traded food
commodities (Tveteras et al. 2012), and its production has
grown rapidly in the last decades, with the bulk coming
from aquaculture (FAO 2018). In 2015, an estimated 33%
of all people involved in fish production were engaged in
aquaculture (Lynch et al. 2017), and this is expected to rise
to 52% in 2025, with the vast majority of employment gen-
erated in lower-income countries (FAO 2018). There are
obvious benefits to engaging in aquaculture, as fish con-
sumption contributes significantly to food and nutrition
security (Bene et al. 2016; Haque & Dey 2016), and aqua-
culture production can play a positive role in increasing
1Including freshwater and saltwater finfish, crustaceans, molluscs and other
aquatic resources.
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local and global fish supplies (Dey et al. 2010; Toufique &
Belton 2014). Moreover, aquaculture has the potential to
alleviate poverty through employment and increased
incomes for poorer, smallholder farmers and other eco-
nomic actors (Dey et al. 2006; Haque et al. 2010; Genschick
et al. 2017; Kassam & Dorward 2017).
Aquaculture can have a positive impact on economic
growth and on countries’ trade balances when targeting
export fish markets (Bush & Belton 2012; Ponte et al. 2014).
The degree to which smallholder producers, and poor peo-
ple2, are able to participate in and benefit from economic
growth that is directly or indirectly attributable to aquacul-
ture development is, however, a contested topic (Stevenson
et al. 2009; Beveridge et al. 2010). Assessing issues of equity
and inclusiveness in agricultural development more broadly
remains a challenge (Seville et al. 2011). This is true for
aquaculture where few studies have attempted to assess the
social equity benefits of aquaculture development (see Pant
et al. 2014; Belton 2016). Whilst it is generally understood
that economic growth is crucial for sustained poverty reduc-
tion, there is evidence that growth can bypass poor and
marginalized people and replicate inequality (Ali & Son
2007). Inclusive growth, therefore, emphasizes the need to
improve economic opportunities for the poor, who are gen-
erally constrained by global, regional and national circum-
stances and market failures (Ali & Zhaung 2007).
There are good arguments for the inclusion of smallhold-
ers and other actors in the aquaculture industry. In Asia,
80% of farmers are termed ‘small-scale’ (Phillips et al.
2016), and in Egypt, 90% of the production of tilapia is
produced by small- and medium-sized enterprises (Mac-
fadyen et al. 2012). These figures suggest that the role of
smallholder farmers is crucial to future fish supplies and
increasing food and nutrition security for consumers
(Waite et al. 2014; Herrero et al. 2017). The concept of a
‘quiet revolution’ in Myanmar (Belton et al. 2018) and
Bangladesh (Hernandez et al. 2018) has recently gained
ground suggesting that a growing increase in small- to
medium-sized enterprises in aquaculture is playing an
important role in economic growth and domestic fish sup-
ply. A study that modelled the impact of aquaculture in
Myanmar revealed that small commercial fish farms gener-
ate larger spillovers by way of retail and labour in the rural
economy than larger commercial farms (Filipski & Belton
2018). Studies in Bangladesh (Belton et al. 2012), and more
recently in Ghana (Kassam & Dorward 2017), also suggest
that the economic multipliers generated by small- to med-
ium-sized farmers had more indirect benefits on poverty
reduction than large commercial cage farms or low input
subsistence ponds (Bush et al. 2019). These studies imply
that there is value in assessing the potential for small- to
medium-sized commercial enterprises and their role in
aquaculture development and growth.
Some studies, however, focus on the social, economic and
environmental risks of participating in the aquaculture sector.
Bryceson (2002) surfaced the detrimental social effects of lar-
ger monopolies on market prices and competition for small-
scale seaweed producers in Tanzania. Khiem et al. (2010)
describe the exodus of small-scale farmers from the Pangasius
sector in Vietnam and the importance of collective bargaining
in improving farmers’ position in the sector. Adduci (2009)
revealed increasing conflicts over privatization and intensify-
ing aquaculture practices in Chilika Lake in India. Tran et al.
(2013) discuss the marginalization and exclusion of small-
holders and traders in Vietnam from the lucrative global
shrimp industry. Similar arguments are made for rural trans-
formations and social well-being in Bangladesh (Belton 2016).
Such analyses are not only limited to the role of smallholders.
Miahle et al. (2015) present how landless people and traders
engage in complex social hierarchies and power relations to
gain access to various aquatic resources in the Philippines.
Genschick et al. (2018) revealed how poor consumers in
urban Zambia are mostly excluded from an increase in
domestically produced farmed tilapia available in local mar-
kets. The opposite is true in places such as Egypt where
domestically produced tilapia became more accessible for
poorer communities (Macfadyen et al. 2012). Without
actively including and recognizing the needs of poorer actors
and certain power asymmetries, it is possible that commercial
developments, intensification and upgrading efforts result in
the exclusion of smallholders, consumers and other poor
actors from the sector (Poole et al. 2013; Genschick et al.
2017).
The promotion of value chain approaches as poverty
alleviation mechanisms has long been used in interna-
tional development and agriculture (Humphrey &
Navas-Aleman 2010; Webber & Labaste 2010). The term
inclusive value chains is often used (Ruben 2017; Naziri
et al. 2017) to describe approaches that attempt to
enhance farmers, traders and consumers access to mar-
kets, and improving productivity and efficiency in ways
that have positive effects on livelihoods, food security,
climate resilience and gender equality (Haggblade et al.
2012; Thorpe et al. 2017 in Ros-Tonen et al. 2019). One
key objective of inclusive value chains is the idea that
greater partnerships between lead firms3, producers,
value chain actors and consumers can help achieve the
above-mentioned goals.
2Those who are marginalized to a certain degree from accessing the natural,
human and financial resources, skills and technologies to actively
participate in value chains by either producing or buying commodities and
inputs.
3Influential organizations that dictate the allocation of resources and
distribution of gains and risks in a value chain, often dictating the terms of
chain membership, including the incorporation/exclusion of other actors,
and the reallocation of value-adding activities (Bolwig et al. 2010).
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Whilst the configuration and function of value chains are
dependent on the peculiarities of their broader economic,
social and cultural environment, we focus this paper on
specific contractual relations and mechanisms that aim to
integrate poor people into value chains. We call these inclu-
sive business models (IBMs), and they have been widely
applied in sectors outside of aquaculture as a means to
incentivize a sector to enable greater participation of and
benefits derived by smallholders and other poor actors in a
value chain (Vorley et al. 2009; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010;
Kelly et al. 2015).
IBMs, such as those found in different agricultural com-
modity value chains (e.g. contract farming with tobacco
smallholders in Zimbabwe (Scoones et al. 2018) or coffee
farmers in Uganda (Bolwig et al. 2009), may be a potential
solution for enabling inclusive participation in and equita-
ble benefits derived from aquaculture value chains by poor
people (Kruijssen et al. 2016). We define IBMs in this paper
as pro-poor, equitable and profitable business activities that
integrate poor producers, processors, retailers, distributors
and consumers in the value chain whilst generating broader
positive development outcomes. We review the literature
on seven types of IBMs commonly used in agriculture value
chains and their application in different aquaculture cases
in lower-income countries. We look at how these models
address the common barriers actors face in aquaculture
value chains and the degree to which they facilitate inclu-
siveness using a global value chain (GVC) analysis. This
approach provides an analytical framework by which to
assess the economic and social upgrading opportunities
presented by IBMs and how these are facilitated by different
levels of relational coordination and contractualization in
the value chain.
Value chains and inclusive business models: an
analytical framework
Rooted in Prahalad’s (2004) theory of the commercial and
development potential of ‘serving the poor’ at the base of
the pyramid (BoP), it is argued that market interventions
can help businesses make profits and transform the BoP
through poverty alleviation (Prahalad & Hammond 2002;
Prahalad & Hart 2002). Inclusive business describes how
organizations engage with the BoP, usually by extending
products and services to poor people as a market base or by
incorporating more ethical policies and mechanisms, such
as improved labour conditions and Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) programmes, as a cornerstone of their
business practice (Likoko & Kini 2017). In this paper, we
do not necessarily discuss pro-poor products and services,
or CSR programmes driven by philanthropic objectives,
but rather assess how businesses are embedded within their
local environment and how poor people are able to make
extended linkages to improve their own businesses and
overall well-being (Altenburg 2007; Wach 2012).
Many models and approaches are centred on promoting
competitiveness and improving collaboration, coordination
and trust between actors based on prevailing market oppor-
tunities (Kelly et al. 2015). IBMs are extended to existing
marketing opportunities either within or between actors in
different nodes of a value chain, and generally describe the
mutually beneficial relationships between these actors that
promote more socially and environmentally responsible
business (see Lundy et al. 2014). A key tenet of IBMs is to
include poor people on the demand side as clients and cus-
tomers; or on the supply side as employees, producers and
business owners (or partners) at various points in the value
chain (UNDP 2008). Not all smallholder farmers and value
chain actors are poor (Murphy 2010) and the realities faced
by poor people in different contexts are highly heteroge-
neous (Ferris & Seville 2010). Our focus is on the actors
who are constrained by their resource endowments and
technical capabilities relative to larger firms operating in
the same chain (Dixon et al. 2003).
A global value chain (GVC) analysis primarily focuses on
the relational dynamics between firms, stakeholders and
different segments of a value chain4 (Gereffi 1994), which
we apply to IBMs as a means of assessing how relations and
business activities can be deemed inclusive. GVC analysis
primarily focuses on two key concepts: coordination and
upgrading.
Assessing the governance of a value chain reveals differ-
ent levels of coordination (or types of contractualization)
between various actors in a particular chain (Gereffi 2011).
This surfaces who exerts more power and influence by
actively shaping the distribution of rewards and risks of
participating in a value chain (Gereffi & Lee 2012). Rela-
tions can be ‘horizontal’, between actors within one node
in a chain (e.g. relations and arrangements between farmers
in a cooperative) or ‘vertical’, between nodes and segments
in a value chain (e.g. contract farming between farmers and
wholesalers) (Gereffi et al. 2005). The degree to which vari-
ous actors participate in and have influence over a value
chain will depend on the strength of their relations within
and between segments.
The relations between different value chains actors, and
particularly between buyers and sellers, are of prime impor-
tance in assessing whether an IBM is, indeed, inclusive and
whether development outcomes can be met (Lundy et al.
2014). The fairness and equity of these relations is critical
as it goes further than just the formation of collaborative
relationships but can also reveal who has power to
4A value chain is defined as the ‘full range of activities that firms and
workers perform to bring a specific product from its conception to its end
use and beyond’ (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011: p. 4).
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influence decisions and outcomes and how equitable
agreements and processes truly are (Gradl & Knobloch
2010). This will largely dictate how poorer value chain
actors and lead firms can upgrade their overall position and
performance in a value chain.
There are two types of upgrading commonly found in
the literature. The first is economic upgrading, which
directly relates to increasing competitiveness in value added
processes that allow economic actors to improve their per-
formance and functions (Gereffi et al. 2005). This relates to
adopting more efficient processes of production (process
upgrading); a change in the type of product (product
upgrading); a change in the mix of activities performed by
a firm (functional upgrading); or a move to a more techno-
logically advanced chain (chain upgrading) (Humphrey &
Schmitz 2002). Social upgrading is defined as the improve-
ments in labour and living conditions and overall social
well-being of workers and actors directly or indirectly
involved in a value chain (see Barrientos et al. 2011). Social
upgrading includes dimensions such as women’s rights,
land ownership, freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining (Saildo Marcos & Bellhouse 2016). The concept
shares similarities with other terms such as social well-
being (Weeratunge et al. 2014), social licence (Arnalds
2011) or social inclusion (Ros-Tonen et al. 2015). Issues of
empowerment, equity, fairness and agency are common
themes in this literature, which we are unable to unpack
here, but which are important aspects of social upgrading.
A third type, environmental upgrading, is recognized in the
literature (Jeppesen & Hansen 2004) and aims to highlight
the narrowness of current upgrading literature that focuses
on developing higher efficiencies at the expense of meeting
environmental standards. Although there is scope to
explore such concepts further, other authors have described
social upgrading as comprising of environmental rights
(Salido Marcos & Bellhouse 2016) or that upgrading must
occur within ecological limits (Bolwig et al. 2010). For the
purpose of this paper, we remain within these framings and
do not use environmental upgrading as a separate category.
Studies in aquaculture have shown how actors can
upgrade their position in a value chain by adopting new
fish strains (Olesen et al. 2007), improving feeding or pro-
cessing procedures to higher standards (Ponte et al. 2014),
improving collective bargaining through cooperation (Ha
et al. 2013) and integrating activities further downstream in
more vertically integrated models (Kaminski et al. 2018).
Other studies in aquaculture have commented on the nega-
tive side of upgrading where improvements in processes,
standards and products has led to voluntary ‘outgrading’
(i.e. exiting a chain) or ‘downgrading’ (i.e. purposive
reduction in functions) as the socio-economic situation of
people worsens due to strict contractual compliance in the
value chain; or from the effects of unfettered global market
forces (Khiem et al. 2010; Ponte et al. 2014). Many studies
have pointed to the fact that economic upgrading (i.e.
access to new inputs, processes, markets) does not necessar-
ily lead to social upgrading (Barrientos et al. 2011; Rossi
2013; Pegler 2015; Vicol et al. 2018). The crux of inclusive-
ness, then, can be found in social upgrading as it directly
relates to the overall well-being and equitable upliftment of
those involved in a value chain. In IBM terms, it also relates
to the development outcomes of those indirectly affected
by a value chain.
This review attempts to identify examples of IBMs that
have been applied in aquaculture value chains. We assess
how IBMs may or may not have achieved their goal of
inclusively and equitably integrating poor actors into value
chains through profitable business models. We particularly
look at types of coordination (i.e. horizontal and vertical),
and the direction and strength of these ties, as well as the
different forms of upgrading that enabled poor actors to
improve their position and performance in various aqua-
culture value chains.
Inclusive business models and barriers to
participation
The literature on IBMs is not extensive and is found mostly
within the grey literature of development practitioners.
Although there are conceptual roots in Prahalad’s theory
on the BoP, as well as driven by the inclusive objectives of
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, espe-
cially on adapting the role of private businesses in value
chains and development, there is little written on the con-
ditions by which IBMs emerge or on their explicit function-
ality. Our review of this literature found three key articles
that discuss various examples of what they call IBMs (Vor-
ley et al. 2009; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; Kelly et al 2015).
Almost all of the models are, however, biased towards
smallholders, and very little is written about opportunities
for poor actors downstream and upstream from produc-
tion. Through our literature search we found several mod-
els, which we summarize in Table 1. These models are
either producer-driven by farmers (collective groups and
clusters); or buyer-driven by suppliers looking to find new
clients and customer; or driven by the development objec-
tives of intermediaries such as governments and non-gov-
ernment organizations (NGOs) (Kelly et al. 2015).
We provide a brief review of the current barriers faced by
aquaculture producers and other value chain actors in the
chain, which IBMs generally attempt to overcome. We use
these criteria to assess whether improved vertical and/or
horizontal coordination and upgrading opportunities
enabled these actors to, indeed, overcome barriers to par-
ticipation and improve their efficiencies and overall posi-
tion in the chain. The following barriers are mostly faced
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by smallholders in aquaculture value chain, though other
actors (such as agribusiness entrepreneurs5) can face simi-
lar barriers:
Access to inputs, technical assistance and services
One of the biggest constraints often repeated in aquaculture
literature is that smallholders lack access to affordable and
high-quality inputs such as feed and seed (Lynch et al.
2017), technical knowledge and rural advisory services, and
affordable transport and storage facilities, especially in
Africa (Brummett et al. 2008). This can also be true for
actors in other parts of the chain.
Access to finance
Smallholders lack access to capital and credit to invest in
aquaculture activities, which in turn prohibits them from
accessing key inputs and services. Smallholders often strug-
gle to access capital and credit because they lack collateral
or cannot afford to pay the excessively high interest rates,
as bankers generally perceive aquaculture as a high-risk
venture (Hishamunda & Manning 2002). Given the infancy
of aquaculture sectors in some lower-income countries,
financial institutions pay little attention to conducting risk
analyses, which results in a lack of suitable financial prod-
ucts for smallholders and entrepreneurs to access. There is
a lack of expansion capital available to small- and medium-
sized enterprises because microfinance institutions perceive
them to be too large and bigger capital investors perceive
Table 1 Definitions of inclusive business models
Type (Vorley et al. 2009) Description Models (Vorley et al. 2009; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; Kelly et al. 2015)
Buyer-driven models Smallholder production is driven by
off-takers such as processors,
exporters and retailers to maximize
benefits in processing and retailing,
often by securing better contracts
with producers. The contracts and
agreements are driven more by
market demand
Contract farming: pre-agreed supply and purchase agreements between
farmers and buyers, usually at an agreed price and delivery date. These
agreements generally provide benefits for traders, processors and
wholesalers. Individual farmers or farmer groups can benefit from access
to improved inputs and markets
Micro-franchising: involves the selling and replication of tried and tested
agribusiness models by the micro-franchisor (firm) to the micro-franchisee
(smallholder or agribusiness entrepreneur). This enables new market
entrants to capitalize on existing knowledge, brands, products and
processes to promote successful self-employment, whilst allowing the
franchisor to expand (Fairbourne 2007)
Joint ventures: co-ownership of a business venture by two independent
market actors who share equity in the venture, thus also sharing the
financial risks and rewards. This generally involves investors and market
actors to both provide some form of capital to the business
Producer-driven models Production is driven by individual or
groups of producers. Their main
objectives are to serve new markets,
achieve better market prices,
stabilize market position, supply
larger volumes, increase bargaining
power and access inputs and
services
Farmer-owned businesses (cooperatives, associations or groups): groups of
farmers organize to generate collective action, share costs and risks and
increase bargaining power. Farmer-owned businesses are normally
incorporated business structures for farmers to pool their assets and limit
liability of individual members. Such businesses are often owned by
cooperatives in order to facilitate business transactions
Tenant farming sharecropping: management contracts in which individual
farmers (or landless labourers) work the land of larger agribusinesses and/
or farms. In tenant farming, the usual arrangement is a fixed rental fee,
whilst in sharecropping, the landowner and sharecropper split the crop (or
its proceeds)
Intermediary-driven models Models driven by intermediary actors
such as market actors (wholesalers),
NGOs or national and local
governments, who focus on food
safety, consistent quality, year-
round supply and innovation at a
competitive price
Public private partnerships: a governing arrangement where public agencies
engage with non-state stakeholders, usually the private sector, in a
collective decision-making process that is consensus oriented (Bj€arstig
2017). The aim is to improve distribute allocation of skills and risks
between the private and public sector
Certification: a governance approach that incentivizes supplier upgrading
by providing food production standards (Bush et al. 2019). This involves
setting up and enforcing standards that set the norm, levels and values of
production and marketing of food products (Hatanaka et al. 2005)
5These include entrepreneurs and businesses within input supply,
transport, trading, processing, marketing, wholesale, retail, etc.
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them to be too small or risky (De Ferranti & Ody 2007;
Macfadyen et al. 2012).
Poor infrastructure and inefficient institutions
Where these are lacking, there are limits to the degree to
which smallholders can expand and adapt to commercializ-
ing value chains dominated by larger firms (Swinnen &
Maertens 2007). The vast geographical distribution of
smallholders in certain countries often results in infrastruc-
ture development in areas that favour larger-scale commer-
cial producers at the expense of rural areas where
predominately poor people live (see the cases of Siavonga
in Zambia [Genschick et al. 2017] and peri-urban areas in
Nigeria [Miller & Atanda 2011]).
Challenges in coordination (e.g. high transaction costs)
between smallholder farmers and other value chain actors
This relates to the costs borne by the public and private sec-
tors to engage with farmers, especially smallholders who
are spatially disbursed and relatively unorganized (Moehl
et al. 2006). Coordination is particularly important in value
chains where quality standards are enforced (Markelova
et al. 2009). The perceived general inefficiency of public
extension (Brummett et al. 2008) and the high costs associ-
ated with the provision of private extension services can
prohibit the formation of extended relations in the value
chain (Ridler & Hishamunda 2001).
Inability to meet requirements and make investments
related to international standards and regulations of high
value markets
Smallholders are sometimes unable to meet the costs of
compliance with market standards and conditions, leading
to exclusion from certain markets (Jespersen et al. 2014).
The social conditions of labour, including of wage employ-
ment and household production labour, may influence the
ability of people to engage in value chains, and often eco-
nomic standards of production are favoured above social
standards (Vince & Haward 2017).
Excessive individual risk related to commercialization
Farmers face a variety of risks in their production, ranging
from those associated with input and output prices, and
various types of production risks such as biosecurity, theft,
animal predation and environmental shocks (Arthur 2008).
These risks cause uncertainty and influence investment
decisions. Risk preferences of individual farmers vary
(Picazo-Tadeo & Wall 2011), dependent also on their loca-
tion within a spectrum of rural poverty (Vorley 2002).
Constraining sociocultural factors
These relate to the prevailing norms, values and beliefs that
can affect the capacities of resource-poor and marginalized
groups to adopt aquaculture technologies or innovations
(Morgan et al. 2017). Ethnic or cultural norms around
cooperation or certain belief systems can enable or con-
strain the adoption of such technologies. Blythe et al.
(2017) found that broader social and institutional factors,
including issues of power, shaped aquaculture adoption in
the Solomon Islands. Harrison (1996) surfaced similar
issues in Zambia in the 1990s, with various beliefs around
land rights preventing fish farmers from improving their
production systems.
The above also includes social and gender norms and
unequal power relations, which are the underlying causes
of inequalities in women’s and men’s participation in aqua-
culture value chains. This includes access to and ownership
of resources (including start-up capital) and other tech-
nologies, training, output markets and the incomes derived
from people’s involvement in aquaculture (Kruijssen et al.
2018). They also dictate the time and effort women and
men are required to invest in activities outside of the aqua-
culture value chain. Most notable are the home-based or
unpaid tasks that women are socially assigned that prohibit
or limit them from engaging in paid activities including fish
farming, processing and trading but also from leaving their
homes to attend trainings or sourcing financial support
from banks located in urban centres (Kruijssen et al. 2018).
Method
There has been little research on IBMs in an aquaculture
context. In this paper, we reviewed case studies from the lit-
erature that provide some insight into the potential busi-
ness models that were used to varying degrees. The review
process relied on journal and Google Scholar searches of
aquaculture case studies in the peer-reviewed and grey liter-
ature. Our first approach was to search ‘aquaculture’ + ‘in-
clusive business model’, which yielded few results. We then
reviewed some of the key studies on IBMs in general (see
Table 1) and settled on the seven models described above.
We searched ‘aquaculture’ + ‘contract farming’; ‘aqua-
culture’ + ‘joint ventures’ and so on, utilizing all seven
business models. We restricted our search to low- and mid-
dle-income countries (LMICs) where smallholders and
poor actors face various barriers, described above; and
where IBMs (as poverty alleviation strategies) are arguably,
most needed. Compared to other agricultural commodities,
such as cotton or coffee, the search yielded few results, thus
showing a critical need to explore inclusive business models
in an aquaculture context. We reviewed the articles to
assess whether indeed an IBM was used, which was notably
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difficult to determine as there is significant variation within
each model and a range of ways in which they were inter-
preted and implemented. We relied on specific mentions of
the IBMs and details of the mechanisms and/or relations
employed in each case, or how specific models helped over-
come some of the barriers described above. We were not
always able to ascertain whether any one model was used or
whether it was able to achieve a certain degree of inclusive-
ness per se, given that most papers did not necessarily focus
on these aspects or use specific GVC terminology. We note
that the overwhelming majority of cases dealt with small-
holders and where possible, we attempt to show IBMs in
other parts of the chain too. In some cases, we were unable
to always ascertain whether target groups or beneficiaries
were indeed poor people. This review, therefore, does not
provide a definitive answer on which models worked or not
based on development outcomes, as this would have to be
addressed in the particular papers under review. Instead,
we focus on the modalities and aim to showcase where any
mechanisms constituted as economic and/or social upgrad-
ing, and which may have enabled actors to overcome some
of the barriers described above. We further attempt to
determine, through induction, what forms of coordination
led to these upgrading opportunities. Where possible, we
attempt to showcase any negative impacts that certain
models may have had or whether they posed risks to inclu-
siveness. A total of 36 papers were reviewed (see Table 2).
Results and discussion
Contract farming
Contract farming or out-grower schemes are agreements
whereby a firm purchases the harvest of independent farm-
ers based on terms and conditions agreed upon in advance
(Baumann 2000). Larger commercial firms and smallhold-
ers agree upon specific prices, delivery dates and the quality
and quantity of goods to be produced (Vermeulen &
Cotula 2010). This usually requires the provision of farm
inputs (seed, feed, credit, extension and training) to small-
holders in return for the delivery of a product (Simmons
2002; Miyata et al. 2009). This allows smallholder farmers
to economically upgrade their products, processes and
functions. There are varying types of contractual arrange-
ments that fall under more centralized models where there
are tighter, coordinated contracts suited for products that
require a higher degree of processing, or more informal
models that are seasonal and require lower levels of support
(Chamberlain & Anseeuw 2017). These forms of contrac-
tual relations are usually vertical (Khiem et al. 2010) and,
depending on their formulation, can be beneficial to both
farmers and other actors in the value chain.
Contract farming agreements have the ability to address
risk, mitigate market failures, reduce transaction costs
associated with uncertainty and addressmarket imperfections
in coordinating the supply chain (Key & Runsten 1999;
Minten et al. 2009; Barrett et al. 2012). Evidence suggests,
however, that contract farming may also reduce the auton-
omy of smallholders whilst increasing their financial and
production risks due to power imbalances that especially
occur during contract negotiation phases (Little & Watts
1994; Kirsten & Sartorius 2002; Abebe et al. 2013). Much
of the literature discusses trajectories of upgrading and
whether contract farming improves farmers’ positions in a
chain or forces farmers to downgrade or even outgrade
(Ponte & Ewert 2009; Khiem et al. 2010). These studies
refer to the constraints faced by smallholders in taking
advantage of upgrading opportunities and improving their
overall position, with some farmers purposefully down-
grading their functions to retain more autonomy in local
markets.
The case of mussel farming in South Africa shows how
well-facilitated contracts can make smaller firms more effi-
cient than larger firms at covering initial transaction costs
associated with farming (Karaan 1999). In this example,
more vertically integrated models, where smallholders
upgraded their position by adopting functions of other
nodes into their activities, were better suited to deal with
pre-production and production costs. Additionally, market
imperfections encouraged the establishment of contractual
arrangements with larger buyers and provided more stabil-
ity for ‘first-time’ farmers. Contracts were based on a com-
bination of resource provision and market specification,
with a strong emphasis on training. The buyer in turn,
acted as a financial intermediary by capitalizing on the
availability of household labour and increasing production
(Karaan 2002), providing benefits for farmers who had
more autonomy in their activities.
In the late 1990s in Thailand, small-scale shrimp farmers
were opposed to fixed-price systems in contracts with large
vertically integrated companies and many of the contract
models broke down (Goss et al. 2000). The lack of success
implementing the models led shrimp companies to pur-
chase shrimp through auctions at harvest sites, which gave
more autonomy for farmers to influence market prices. To
counter such issues of fixed-price systems, five shrimp-
farming cooperatives in Vietnam joined together to form a
federation, whose responsibility it was to negotiate various
agreements with large processors and buyers to secure a
market for their shrimp (Ha et al. 2013). The cooperatives
allowed farmers to upgrade their functional and relational
dimensions of production through increased horizonal
coordination. In such cases, there is crossover between con-
tract farming, where vertical relationships are established
between farmers and other nodes in the value chain, and
farmer-owned businesses or collectives (discussed below),
where horizontal relationships are built between farmers to
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bolster collective action and negotiating power. The latter
forms of horizontal coordination can provide social
upgrades such as freedom of association and/or increased
decision-making and bargaining power that can help secure
vertical contracts.
Contract farming can also be a means of ensuring supply
side quality specifications, as seen in the Pangasius sector in
Vietnam (Trifkovic 2014). Larger processors vertically inte-
grated their primary functions and were both suppliers of
inputs (seed and antibiotics) and buyers of Pangasius based
on international food standards. The agreements made
were a means to source unprocessed Pangasius through
marketing contracts with smallholders. To make contracts
more inclusive, Trifkovic (2014) suggests that agreements
should contain knowledge sharing and learning opportuni-
ties that allow smallholders to upgrade their farms. Khiem
et al. (2010), however, showed that the smallest Pangasius
grow-out farmers in Vietnam who did not have the infras-
tructure and capital to invest in upgrading opted to exit the
value chain altogether (i.e. outgrading).
Micro-franchising
Micro-franchising refers to a business model that enables
new market entrants to capitalize on existing knowledge,
brands, products and processes to promote successful self-
employment, whilst allowing the franchisor to expand geo-
graphically (Kistruck et al. 2011). Micro-franchisees oper-
ate under the firm’s trade name and guidance in return for
a small fee yet retain ownership of their operations. The
degree to which the micro-franchisee is automated relates
directly to the amount of risk the smallholder is exposed to
(Christensen et al. 2010). In the case of inclusive businesses
with smallholders, it may also involve a provision of inputs
such as credit, feed and seed (Kistruck et al. 2011).
In Bangladesh, the Shiblee Hatchery Farms project was
launched in 2013 with 100 landless farmers to enable them
to engage in the culture of tilapia in cages (van Dijk et al.
2015). Whilst the model was originally based on a combi-
nation of tenant and contract farming, the goal of the pro-
ject was to develop a franchise model for tilapia, where
farmers could cultivate fish with more autonomy than
would otherwise be offered through contract farming. Shi-
blee Hatchery Farms provided access to quality inputs such
as seed, training and advice and helped facilitate farmers’
access to finance and equipment, as well as providing a
stable market for fish. The training involved cage construc-
tion, fish husbandry, disease recognition, credit planning
and marketing (van Dijk et al. 2015), all important eco-
nomic upgrades for the farms.
According to Rogers et al. (2011), micro-franchise mod-
els are most inclusive when they accommodate local needs,
are simple enough for low-income groups to operate,
involve some degree of mentoring between the franchisor
and franchisees and function under a detailed operating
system developed and ensured by the franchisor. Micro-
franchising could, therefore, allow better opportunities for
social upgrading than contract farming as it provides farm-
ers more autonomy to operate businesses that they are able
to adapt to their needs.
In oyster and mussel farming in South Africa, Karaan
(2002) found that franchise models are more efficient than
contract farming because they are easier to enforce and
franchises are less prone to bureaucratic issues (i.e. faster
decision-making). In both examples above, micro-franchis-
ing offered better upgrading opportunities than contract
Table 2 Total numbers of papers under review
Models Publications No
#
Contract farming Karaan (1999) (South Africa); Goss et al. (2000) (Thailand); Khiem et al. (2010) (Vietnam); Ha et al. (2013)
(Vietnam); Trifkovic (2014) (Vietnam)
5
Micro-franchising Karaan (2002) (South Africa); Van Dijk et al. (2015) (Bangladesh); Obwanga & Lewo (2017) (Kenya); Otieno et al.
(2018) (Kenya)
4
Joint ventures Oellermann (2014) (South Africa) 1
Farmer-owned businesses Ravikumar & Yamamoto (2009) (Indonesia); Umesh et al. (2009) (India); Lebel et al. (2010) (Thailand); Miller &




Mandima (1995) (Zimbabwe); Prein et al. (1996) (Ghana); Siriwardena (1999) (Sri Lanka); Asian Development
Bank (2005) (Philippines); Belton et al. (2014) (Bangladesh); Adnan (2013) (Bangladesh); Miahle et al. (2015)




Weirowski & Hall (2008) (global); Lebel et al. (2009) (Mexico); FAO (2013a) (Nigeria); FAO (2013b) (Philippines) 4
Certification Belton et al. (2009) (Thailand); Belton et al. (2011) (Vietnam & Bangladesh); Anh et al. (2011) (Vietnam); Bush
and Belton (2012) (Bangladesh); Marschke and Wilkings (2014) (Vietnam); Tran et al. (2013) (Vietnam);
Samerwong et al (2018) (Thailand)
7
Total 36
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farming by providing farmers equal opportunities to cover
initial transaction costs and easier enforcement of agree-
ments to franchisees rather than individually contracted
farmers. Becoming a franchisee under such models, how-
ever, may require more skills, knowledge and financial cap-
ital from the beginning (Rogers et al. 2011).
In Kenya, a non-profit organization, Farm Africa,
attempted to set up a micro-franchise model of supply
chain agribusinesses that provided inputs for thousands of
smallholder tilapia farmers (Obwanga & Lewo 2017). Farm
Africa worked with the agribusinesses to establish ‘Aqua
Shops’ to sell basic aquaculture inputs and equipment, and
provide training and technical support to farmers
(Obwanga & Lewo 2017). Fifty-six shops were set up in five
years benefiting over 7500 farmers, increasing their incomes
by 63% (Otieno et al. 2018). The model was developed and
driven by an NGO in partnership with private sector actors
and was donor supported. This case demonstrates that
focusing on businesses further upstream or downstream
from smallholders may be more beneficial in terms of pro-
viding farmers opportunities for economic upgrading than
focusing on developing specific IBMs with smallholders.
The manner in which farmers engaged with the Aqua Shops
(i.e. loans, credit transactions) is unclear, and the articles
above do not provide details on the nature of these
relationships.
Joint ventures
Joint venture models differ from contract farming primar-
ily on the basis that they are co-ownership agreements
between firms and smallholders (or farmer organizations,
cooperatives, associations and trusts). The two actors share
equity in the venture, thus equally distributing the financial
risks and rewards. Joint ventures mean that investors and
smallholders both provide some form of capital to the ven-
ture. Joint ventures generally allow smallholders to unlock
potential value from available land by using it as leverage to
gain greater ownership of the business. Joint equity invest-
ments allow for multiple economic upgrading opportuni-
ties for smallholder farmers and equal decision-making
powers between the two actors, which few of the other
models exemplify (Vermeulen & Cotula 2010).
The only joint venture example found in the literature
was where a company called Amatikulu Prawn (Pty) Ltd.
assisted employees to set up small-scale ornamental fish
farms near their prawn production site in 1992 using a joint
equity model. The company provided seed and extension
services and bought back the ornamental fish from their
employees and sold to export markets under the Amatikulu
brand. By 1995, 25 satellite farms were established. At these
farms, employees were able to diversify into fish farming.
Despite the collapse of the joint equity model in 1998 due
to export market restrictions on ornamental fish,
Oellermann (2014) maintains that the model allowed
small-scale entrants into capital-intensive aquaculture
under one brand name. There are obvious overlaps between
joint venture models and micro-franchising or contract
farming models, the key difference being joint equity
financing. The financing aspect that characterizes joint ven-
tures may, to some degree, explain why our literature
search only found one example of this type of model.
Farmer-owned businesses (cooperatives, associations or
groups)
In farmer-led models, smallholders pool their resources
together using a formal organizational structure, usually
through associations, trusts, cooperatives or collectives (see
Kassam et al. 2011). Farmer-owned businesses are similar
to cluster arrangements where the goals are to access capi-
tal, pool resources and start a related business, which helps
limit the liability of individual members (Narrod et al.
2009). The difference between these collective groups and
farmer-owned businesses is that the latter are incorporated
and registered as enterprises. Whilst cooperatives are a pop-
ular example of a collective action group, there is evidence
that larger businesses are averse to working with coopera-
tives because of their slow decision-making abilities (Vorley
et al. 2009). By creating formal companies, farmers can
avoid the issues involved in collective decision-making.
There is thus an implied trade-off between a cooperative,
with democratic representation of all members, and a
farmer-owned, incorporated business that can make rapid
decisions by an executive committee that results in greater
efficiencies. Farmer-owned businesses in agriculture are
widespread and often involve collective activities such as
marketing boards or agencies, processing facilities, distribu-
tion agencies and service provision (Vermeulen & Cotula
2010). In aquaculture, there are examples of cooperatives
and collective action groups being used as a means to
improve economic performance and participate in global
value chains by countervailing market power for smallhold-
ers where high degrees of power are often concentrated
upstream and downstream from production (Kassam et al.
2011).
One of the more successful associations identified is the
Surat Thani Shrimp Farmers Club that was developed as an
informal support group for farmers and is financed by
donations from its members (Kassam et al. 2011). The
group was able to coordinate an increase in production of
shrimp by disseminating knowledge that enabled farmers
to prevent emerging diseases and mitigate environmental
risks (Lebel et al. 2010). The social networks between farm-
ers in the associations, but also the vertical relations
between farmers and hatcheries who operated in close
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proximity to farmers, is noted by Lebel et al. (2010) to have
created a highly organized system of trust, innovation and
knowledge dissemination.
In Madagascar, a sea cucumber farmer association
employed 20 four-person teams to manage one pen and
divided the profits between all members of the association,
52% who were women (Vincent & Morrison-Saunders
2013). An NGO helped improve techniques for increasing
juvenile survival rates from 46% to 76.9%, mostly by
improving handling techniques and farming processes. The
NGO encouraged farmers to use the incomes they earned
from farming to pay for school fees for their children. Such
a small collective group of farmers that is embedded in the
community is able to adapt to local needs through horizon-
tal coordination that can have better chances of extending
social upgrading to living and working conditions.
The Samroiyod Cooperative in the gulf of Thailand com-
prised smallholder shrimp farmers, almost half of who were
women (Kassam et al. 2011). Declining international
shrimp prices incentivized farmers to group together to
compound their efficiencies in production. The farmers,
managed by an executive committee, implemented better
management practices and enforced the prohibition of
banned chemicals and antibiotics. Members of the coopera-
tive were able to acquire credit, technical advice and access
to a computerized traceability system. As a result of such
horizontal coordination, the cooperative was able to secure
market access to a local processing plant with a European
Union (EU) buyer. In such examples, it is evident that
improved horizontal coordination can lead to establishing
more lucrative vertical relationships later on.
Aquaculture livelihood service centres were developed by
the donor community in response to the devastation of
coastal livelihoods by the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia (Mills
et al. 2011). The service centres were originally designed to
develop and maintain high-quality seed for farmers operat-
ing in various clusters in the absence of government or pri-
vate sector extensions services. The centres eventually
incorporated trainings and acted as a central point where
farmers could meet and bargain with overseas buyers by
accessing communication technologies (Ravikumar &
Yamamoto 2009). Farmers were able to establish business
linkages with hatchery operators, input suppliers, proces-
sors and exporters. The service centres also offered a central
location for community meetings and learning workshops,
accessed even by farmers from outside of the association.
The centres operated disease diagnoses, training services,
credit facilities and laboratory services that were available
to farmers. Although donor financed, the centres grew to
allow farmers to make multiple relationships with overseas
buyers whilst also offering various services for farmers.
In India, an investment fee was paid to become a mem-
ber of a shrimp-farming group with a set limit of shares
available (Umesh et al. 2009). All members had to abide by
production regulations developed by the executive commit-
tee, which were similar to better management practices
promoted by a public body in India. By abiding by the
cooperative regulations, members were able to increase
production of higher-quality shrimp based on international
food standards. This also allowed for standardization of
products and processes across the value chain and increased
opportunities for exportation.
In Nigeria groups of investors, mostly retired civil ser-
vants, invested in land and catfish farming in what they
called ‘fish farming villages’ (estates), so that they could
work together and invite private investment and public
extension support (Miller & Atanda 2011). Such horizontal
coordination and collective action allowed farmers to later
increase their connections with larger firms and secure bet-
ter inputs and markets.
Farmer-owned businesses are oftentimes implemented
together with other models to ensure increased agency for
smallholders when negotiating contracts and managing
their relationships with other firms up or downstream in a
value chain. It is clear that such horizontal relations create
more opportunities for social upgrading in terms of allow-
ing farmers the freedom of association, establishing collec-
tive action based on local knowledge and customs and
increasing their position of power in a value chain. We
argue that in such circumstances, social upgrading is what
leads to further economic upgrading opportunities in the
chain. However, many of these collectives are often sup-
ported by governments and NGOs before the private sector
recognizes a sufficient downturn in risks and potential
rewards from establishing further linkages.
Sharecropping and tenant farming
Sharecropping and tenant farming are perhaps the most
commonly found business arrangements in agriculture and
have existed for centuries. In sharecropping, smallholders
are responsible for managing a piece of land owned by a
firm or landowner, and the provision of inputs is usually
divided between the two parties. Smallholders provide a
landowner a return of either a share of the crop, a share of
the proceeds from the crop, or some predetermined combi-
nation of the two. Inclusive sharecropping arrangements
are meant to share the landlord’s assets and knowledge with
farmers (often landless people) who work on the land (Del-
gado 1999). The two actors generally share the risk expo-
sure to harvest failures or price fluctuations. Tenant
farming is similar, although farmers lease the land from a
firm or landowner and therefore bear the whole risk of the
harvest. The tenant (or company) only pays rent to the
landowner or firm and has outright ownership of the out-
put (Belton et al. 2014). In the Philippines, sharecropping
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and aquaculture has created complex social systems where
landowners and sharecroppers cooperate to produce for
global and local markets and where poor landless people
can still access certain aquatic resources through gleaning
and trading activities (Mialhe et al. 2015).
Sharecropping and tenant farming has historically cre-
ated negative outcomes for some smallholders because of
the high possibility of exploitative practices and disagree-
ments (Ray 2005), which can range from disputes on issues
of how to use the land to how to distribute the rewards.
Vermeulen and Cotula (2010) suggest that there can be
positive outcomes from sharecropping and tenant farming
when the terms and conditions are carefully set and gov-
erned by a third party.
In Sri Lanka, the government examined sharecropping as
a tool to ease concerns of commercial shrimp farming
expanding into people’s lands (Siriwardena 1999) and thus
extended opportunities for social upgrading opportunities
between landowners and sharecroppers by providing a
more equitable land tenure framework. Sharecropping and
tenant farming can lead to greater knowledge sharing and
learning opportunities as landless farmers gain experience
by having access to farmable land, as seen in India (Belton
et al. 2017). A survey of rural fish farmers in Zimbabwe
found that farmers learned more about aquaculture whilst
working as labourers on other farms than they would have
as subsistence smallholders, thus acquiring basic expertise
in fish farming that they later applied to their own small-
holdings (Mandima 1995). In Ghana, Prein et al. (1996)
found various forms of tenant farming, including tenant
farmers and landowners sharing land and landowners leas-
ing land to groups of farmers. Both forms of tenant farming
allowed farmers to successfully venture into tilapia aqua-
culture as new entrants and diversify their livelihoods.
In Bangladesh, sharecropping has created some negative
effects. The transition from rice paddy farming to shrimp
farming turned traditional sharecropping contracts into
leasing contracts where landless sharecroppers were some-
times removed from accessing any land, suggesting that
sharecropping is not resilient to agricultural transforma-
tions and commercialization (Belton et al. 2016). To coun-
ter such negative effects, farmers in the Philippines received
certificates of landownership from the government that
allowed them to lease land temporarily, thus giving them
access to resources and greater land tenure security (Asian
Development Bank 2005). Smallholders who have land and
attempt to engage in sharecropping do not always have the
financial power to remain in control. Powerful actors can
take advantage of smallholders and, in worst cases, seize
land from vulnerable groups (Adnan 2013). Although the
benefits of economic upgrading are apparent in sharecrop-
ping and tenant farming, these arrangements have a high
risk of engendering further inequalities when smallholders’
land and other rights are not protected by governments or
other actors.
Public private partnerships
According to a manual on public private partnerships
(PPPs) by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), the private sec-
tor recognizes an increasing role in international coopera-
tion and development, especially market integration and
working with governments to build more sustainable
enabling environments. The aim of PPPs is to achieve the
basic tenets of IBMs by using the skills of the private and
public sectors to manage risks and improve quality services
and cost-effectiveness in supply chains and markets, or
products and processes (Weirowski & Hall 2008).
PPPs may not always be regarded as an IBM based on
the definition provided above as they do not necessarily
entail setting up contractual relationships between a larger
firm and smallholders or agribusinesses. However, there are
examples of PPPs where one or two firms work together
with local governments to integrate smallholders into the
value chain. The Lagos government and an Israeli agri-tech
company encouraged young Nigerian farmers to become
agro-entrepreneurs. The government funded the scheme
and the Israeli company managed food production and
processing facilities for the government whilst being paid a
fee to train the young agro-entrepreneurs (FAO 2013a).
Another PPP between the city of Panabo, fisher associations
and the local government marine resources department
promoted mariculture in the Philippines. Private partners
contributed 80% of the total investment funds, whilst the
government provided infrastructure and equipment. The
partnership resulted in increased profits for farmers and an
additional 500 jobs in the value chain (FAO 2013b).
Most PPPs, however, operate at the macro-level by creat-
ing an enabling environment for private investment and
smallholder development, from which other IBMs can
emerge. One example is the promotion of “aqua-parks,”
where governments designate a site specifically for aquacul-
ture development and offer incentives (e.g. tax and permit
exemptions) to the private sector to establish businesses
that provide services, delivery of inputs and the develop-
ment and marketing of products (Bueno et al. 2015). Lebel
et al. (2009) briefly discuss an “aqua-park” in Mexico that
portioned shrimp farmland with shared access to canals.
Strong cooperative arrangement between farmers emerged
as a result. A labour union was involved to provide admin-
istrative support by contracting skilled personnel to operate
the farms, whilst farmers, who constituted less-skilled
labour, worked on the farms. The arrangement provided
farmers with external support for certain high-skilled, spe-
cialized jobs that they would otherwise be unable to per-
form.
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According to Weirowski and Hall (2008), a PPP between
a German fish import company and a NGO helped supply
organic Pangasius produced by smallholders in Vietnam to
consumers in European markets. The PPP increased knowl-
edge on organic aquaculture in the Mekong Delta and also
raised awareness of environmental and food safety chal-
lenges that farmers and other value chain actors faced in
Vietnam. Such PPPs create important economic and social
upgrading opportunities, including better labour and wage
conditions, more equitable contracts or improved environ-
mental conditions that ultimately benefit smallholder
farmers.
Certification
Certification is increasingly seen as a “hands off” approach
to governance that incentivizes supplier upgrading by pro-
viding increased profits when food production standards
are met (Bush et al. 2019). Certification involves setting up
and enforcing standards that set the norm, levels and values
of production and marketing of food products (Hatanaka
et al. 2005). There is some disagreement as to how inclusive
certification models are of smallholders (Samerwong et al.
2018). Generally, certification standards are considered to
be difficult to meet for smallholder aquaculture farmers
(Belton et al. 2009; Tran et al. 2013; Jespersen et al. 2014),
mainly due to the high costs associated with compliance
(Belton et al. 2017). Anh et al (2011) show how only a small
number of Vietnamese farmers were able to adopt water-
use reduction strategies as an environmental standard that
was part of a governance certification scheme set up by
state-enforced legislature. Khiem et al. (2010) note how
smallholder Pangasius farmers opted out of the value chain
or purposefully downgraded their production because of
the difficulty in complying with the standards of interna-
tional export markets. Outside of aquaculture, a study on a
global certification scheme that aimed to provide access to
a higher value export market for horticulture farmers in
Kenya found a 60% drop in formal participation by small-
holders, where only 10 exporters controlled 50% of the
market (Graffham et al. 2007). There is some evidence that
certification can have positive effects on integrating small-
holders when the risks that accompany efforts to obtain
certification are spread amongst smallholders (Bush & Bel-
ton 2012; Marschke & Wilkings 2014).
Based on this literature, we argue that whilst certification
can provide access to more lucrative or niche markets, cer-
tification does not necessarily provide the economic
upgrading required for smallholder farmers to produce
consistently at an efficient level. Neither does it typically
provide any access to inputs or services and thus almost
always has to be accompanied by one or several of the other
IBMs presented above. We argue that the ability of farmers
to upgrade their performance and position will be more
determined by the vertical and horizontal relations they can
build within other IBMs. Certification then, is a mechanism
under which other IBMs could operate. Although some
certification schemes aim to provide farmers with social
upgrading opportunities, such as improved social licensing
or recognizing social welfare standards in production, with-
out the support of the private sector, NGOs or govern-
ments, few farmers are able to participate in such schemes.
Synthesis of results under GVC analytical framework
Many of the models overlapped in their make-up and
operation, and based on our review, it appears no one
model is better than the other in equitably integrating
smallholders or other actors into value chains. In many
cases, a combination of these models was used, such as
in Vietnam where contract farming models imple-
mented in the Pangasius value chain were arranged to-
gether with farming cooperatives (Khiem et al. 2010),
and in shrimp farming in Thailand, where contract
farming models broke down with farming cooperatives.
In the mussel value chain in South Africa, for example,
elements of both contract farming and franchise models
were used (Karaan 1999, 2002). Trifkovic (2014) sug-
gested that certification standards and PPPs were criti-
cal in establishing an enabling environment for contract
farming in the Pangasius value chain in Vietnam.
Figure 1 presents how the different IBMs can be included
in an aquaculture value chain to enable greater participa-
tion of and benefits derived by smallholders and other poor
actors. The figure provides an overview of how the different
models work together and how the development of hori-
zontal and vertical relations can operate simultaneously
within IBMs operating in this hypothetical value chain.
From our review, it was not always easy to decipher under
what conditions the IBMs emerged. Whilst we discussed
that IBMs may be driven more by buyers and marketeers in
an effort to secure better contracts with producers or other
actors in a value chain; or driven by smallholder producers
to gain a better foothold in a value chain – or even driven
by the philanthropic goals of NGOs – the existence of certi-
fication programmes or PPPs can also stimulate more con-
tractualization between nodes. In Figure 1, we present what
IBMs may look like in a value chain and the importance of
the horizontal and vertical relations that allow smallholders
and/or agribusiness entrepreneurs the possibility to enter
into various contractual relations that can establish a better
coordinated value chain. In certain cases, horizontal coor-
dination provided the impetus for establishing vertical rela-
tionships further down the line, such as with the livelihood
service centres in Indonesia or cooperatives in Thailand
and Vietnam.
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Figure 1 An example of how IBMs operate in an aquaculture value chain. *The nodes are colour-coded: orange – input supplies; green – produc-
tion; blue – processing, trading and retail; purple – consumers; red – government; light blue – intermediaries (certifiers, NGOs). Small red arrows indi-
cate horizontal or vertical relations.
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Very few of the models in our review and the IBM
literature go into detail on how to ensure inclusiveness. We
attempt to do this by relying on the GVC analysis to pro-
vide operational terms we can use to distinguish between
the relations and forms of coordination that enable actors
to upgrade their position and performance in a value chain.
We acknowledge, however, that more research is required
to capture the dimensions and indicators of inclusiveness
in IBMs as well as within value chain approaches to aqua-
culture development. For the purpose of this discussion, we
look at how these models helped overcome barriers by
enabling economic and social upgrading and where they
still pose risks to inclusiveness (see Table 3).
Almost all models in the reviewed cases presented some
sort of benefits gained through economic upgrading, such
as new products, processes and functions that enabled
smallholders or poor entrepreneurs to improve their
agribusinesses. These economic upgrades generally pro-
vided actors with inputs, services, training, knowledge or
credit that allowed them to overcome some of the eco-
nomic barriers they faced when trying to enter into or par-
ticipate more meaningfully in a value chain. There is
evidence, however, that maintaining a business at an effi-
cient level with these economic upgrades under certain
agreements (contract farming or sharecropping) may over-
burden farmers who try to comply with high production
standards; or create exploitative agreements where farmers
do not necessarily improve their labour or living condi-
tions. Social upgrading is regarded as a necessary mecha-
nism that allows for more equitable business arrangements,
processes and functions so that poor actors can overcome
barrier to participating in value chains. It is evident from
Table 3 that the degree to which actors are able to success-
fully participate in value chains has much to do with the
nature of agreements, decision-making, labour or liveli-
hood conditions and well-being. Certain models such as
farming cooperatives or micro-franchises seem to offer bet-
ter social upgrading conditions, which poor farmers and
entrepreneurs can operate under to enable more equitable
and empowering outcomes (i.e. increased agency). Free-
dom of association, independent decision-making and
adapting the management of businesses and contracts to
local needs allow poor actors to shape the direction of the
enterprise on a more equal power basis in a value chain.
One major risk with these models, however, is that without
carefully enacting social protections in the make-up of the
associations or businesses, they may replicate inequalities
that exist at the local level, such as gender inequalities or
unequal land distribution. There is little evidence in the
reviewed papers where social upgrading actively responded
to the needs of women or youth, for example. In many
cases, external stakeholders such as government and NGOs
were responsible for making IBMs more socially equitable,
as opposed to the businesses themselves actively making
such efforts.
We conclude that a mix of vertical and horizontal rela-
tions will develop more inclusive and equitable business
models. A contract farming model between smallholders
and a larger buyer will likely be more inclusive when farm-
ers are also able to establish horizontal relations and where
arrangements include both economic and social upgrading
opportunities. Whilst some authors questions whether eco-
nomic upgrading can lead to social upgrading (Barrientos
et al. 2011; Rossi 2013; Pegler 2015), we argue that estab-
lishing social upgrading (equal power dynamics and labour
processes) through horizontal coordination can lead to lay-
ing a foundation where other upstream and downstream
actors will be more willing to engage in new vertical rela-
tionships and set up IBMs (e.g. contract farming). This can
present new economic upgrading opportunities, which in
turn may provide a need for additional social upgrad-
ing within the vertical arrangement.
The degree to which these business models succeed in
being inclusive is only marginally dependent on the models
used and is more associated with how they are being imple-
mented and by whom. Backstopping and support from gov-
ernment and/or the donor community can greatly hedge
certain risks for the private sector. If investments are made
without also leveraging social development schemes (e.g.
gender equity) localized inequalities can be replicated in
business arrangements. It is evident that inclusive business
models hinge on supporting institutions to facilitate the
relationship between investors and smallholders or entre-
preneurs and establish clear roles and responsibilities for
governments, private sector actors and the donor commu-
nity. Ha et al. (2013) call for governments to develop pro-
duction infrastructure and create legal frameworks for
private sector-led cluster formation. Such government
intervention can be seen, for example, in the concept of
‘aqua-parks’ created through the establishment of PPPs.
Contract farming agreements can, for instance, benefit
from a strong legal framework to address issues of non-
compliance or exploitative practices (Trifkovic 2014). Man-
agement contracts, tenant farming and sharecropping all
depend on strong laws and regulations as well as local
norms and beliefs surrounding landownership and land-
use rights. In the absence of such social upgrading within a
business model, the role of governments and donors is vital
but arguably insufficient, hence the need for the private sec-
tor to leverage such opportunities. In Bangladesh, weak
regulatory capacity with respect to poor compliance with
food safety standards and inadequate enforcement of exist-
ing laws meant there was less upgrading taking place at the
smallholder level than would have otherwise been realized
(Toufique & Belton 2014). Conversely, investment in the
creation of new regulations and public infrastructure in
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Table 3 Synthesis of IBMs and GVC analysis
IBM Coordination Economic upgrading Social upgrading Risks to inclusiveness
Contract farming Vertical • Reduces transaction costs
• Reduces market risk and mar-
ket imperfections
• Increases access to inputs,
which women and poorest
farmers lack access to
• Increases access to finance and
new markets
• Can improve relationships and
trust between nodes




• Can include development of
social conditions outside of
production (e.g. education,
health)
• Smallholder bears production
risk
• Difficulty in meeting contract
requirements
• Could lead to more uneven
power relations
• Requires access to some assets
(land/ponds), which oftentimes
women and youth lack
• Could limit financial returns
when based on fixed prices
• Farmers can become excluded
or trapped in contractual
agreements
• Can replicate social inequalities
(e.g. targeting men farmers
and using women’s labour
with minimal benefits
received)
Micro-franchising Horizontal • Leverages a strong brand and
reduces market risk
• Strong vertical integration con-
trols for quality product
• Provision of all inputs and
technical assistance
• Collective action reduces pro-
duction risks
• Can create legal protection on
labour conditions and social
equity under one brand name
rather than under multiple
independent operators
• Reduces bureaucracy and slow
decision-making of coopera-
tives
• Reduces ability of individual
farmers to make independent
decisions
• Requires substantial buy-in
and capital
• Requires innovative private
sector actors
• Requires business acumen and
codes of conduct or constitu-
tions
• Risk sharing means that all
actors could be responsible for
actions of a few
Joint ventures Vertical • Provides opportunities to gen-
erate revenue outside of busi-
ness processes
• Financial risk is shared
between actors
• Actors can venture into new
lucrative markets
• Increases ownership and bal-
ances power
• Provides equal decision-mak-
ing and more agency
• Generates more equitable
sharing of rewards and deci-
sion-making
• Risk for smallholder is greater
than for firm
• Restricted to farmers with cap-
ital and assets, which further
restricts marginalized groups
• Can require high business skills
as prerequisite
• Usually small contracts that






Horizontal • Pools resources to access bet-
ter quality inputs
• Creates flexible trading
arrangements with intermedi-
aries
• Provides an attractive base for
more financial investment
from other value chain actors
• Farmers have equal voting
rights within the organization
• Increases bargaining power
with other value chain nodes
• Self-determination over man-
agement of business and prac-
tices
• Adapted to local needs and
labour processes
• Requires strong organizational
and governance structures
• Risk of free-riding
• Not always accessible to all, as
membership is often fee-based
• Social norms may be pervasive,
and inequalities can be repli-
cated (i.e. for marginalized
groups)
• Often requires development
support to set up
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support of aquaculture led to successful product and
process upgrading in some Asian countries and a strong
reputation for high-quality farmed seafood produced under
fair social conditions (Ponte et al. 2014).
Conclusion
This review is a first step in synthesizing a collection of
papers around inclusive business models found in aqua-
culture case studies in low-income countries. The con-
cept of inclusive business models is gaining ground in
government, donor, civil society and private sector cir-
cles, pointing to a critical need for designing conceptual
and operational frameworks and piloting more IBMs
that fit the aquaculture context. We highlight the
importance of determining the inclusiveness of these
models by assessing the nature of the relationships
between actors, as well as the economic and social
upgrading opportunities that are presented as a result
of horizontal and vertical coordination. We conclude
this paper with some additional insights and suggest
areas where further research and development efforts
are needed.
First, almost all of the IBM literature and the cases
in our review focused on smallholder development.
There is a critical need to apply value chain approaches
to assessing IBMs, especially in the potential for models
in other parts of the value chain where poor actors
stand to benefit.
Second, whilst social and economic upgrading provide
useful tools to examine various mechanisms of inclusive
business models there is a notable gap in properly assessing
environmental upgrading. Our review suggests that some
forms of coordination led to increased awareness about dis-
ease control or environmental impacts, which were argu-
ably important environmental upgrades. These papers
however, did not reveal whether incorporating such
upgrades had any effect on production efficiencies.
Table 3 (continued)
IBM Coordination Economic upgrading Social upgrading Risks to inclusiveness
Sharecropping and
tenant farming
Horizontal • Provides mechanism for credit
and input provision
• Provides access to land for
landless farmers
• Potential for knowledge shar-
ing and learning
• Can develop governance and
land management systems
based on local needs
• Can have indirect develop-
ment impacts (e.g. food secu-
rity) on “the poorest of the
poor”
• By providing labour on other
farms, farmers can apply newly
learned techniques to own
farms
• High risk of replicating social
inequalities
• Exposure to marketing risk
• Exposure to exploitative prac-
tices (sharecropping especially)
• Could lead to uneven power
relations
• Present examples seem to rely
heavily on development fund-





• Closes the infrastructure
financing gap through private
sector capital
• Removes financial responsibil-
ity from public sector
• Risk sharing between public
and private entities
• Better allocation of private and
public skills
• Can remove exploitative prac-
tices from private sector by
establishing rights-based
frameworks
• Can provide greater room for
Social Licence Operators
• Farmers and poor or marginal-
ized people may not always
have a voice in design and run-
ning of partnerships
• Can be difficult to enforce
when roles and responsibilities
are not clearly established
• Relies on strong leadership –
conflicts between public and
private entities can hinder pro-
jects and poor actors stand to
lose out
Certification Vertical • Creates high-quality inputs
and outputs and improves
farmers’ capacities and
incomes
• Standardizes inputs and tech-
nical know-how
• Provides standardized products
and processes across industry
• Can improve relationships and
trust between nodes
• Certified products can include
social equity indicators such as
fair labour practices, inclusion
of marginalized groups, etc.
• Can provide farmers with a
social licence and improve
labour conditions
• Many farmers struggle to com-
ply with standards
• Standards can be invasive and
not adapted to local context
• Difficult to enforce standards,
especially around social equity
• Farmers can become excluded
or trapped in contractual
agreements
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Upgrading and inclusiveness then, require a more thorough
conceptualization of environmental considerations.
Third, almost a third of the studies were found in sub-
Saharan Africa, which may seem surprising given that <1%
of the total global aquaculture output is produced in the
region and since the history and trajectory of aquaculture
development is much longer in Asia than in Africa (FAO
2018). Promoting ethical and inclusive businesses is an
attractive proposition for governments, investors and the
donor community and likely the reason why our review
found so many models in Africa where aquaculture is still a
nascent industry and where governments and donors advo-
cate for more social responsibility and inclusive economic
growth in the sector. IBMs then, in many ways, still have
connections to the donor community and development
practices where NGOs and governments increasingly sup-
port private businesses to operate at the bottom of the
pyramid. The role of businesses and the donor community
in the establishment and implementation of these models
requires more attention.
Fourth, there is a need to understand the context of
aquaculture (e.g. fingerling supply, animal husbandry, etc.)
and fish as a commodity (value, marketability, perishabil-
ity) and explore which models best exploit these character-
istics under what circumstances. Can contract farming
models used in coffee in South America or cotton in Africa
be applied to aquaculture in different contexts, for exam-
ple? According to Murekezi et al. (2018), aquaculture is
well suited for contract farming because it is labour-inten-
sive and aquaculture produce is perishable and has a high
value-to-weight ratio. Minot and Sawyer (2016) state that
commodities that require high expertise and regulation
such as tobacco and cotton ensure better enforcement of
contracts. However, there is still a large gap in research and
literature around IBMs and their application in aquacul-
ture. Furthermore, aquaculture production systems are so
broad and varied in different contexts around the world
that some value chains may be better suited for IBMs than
others. For example, extensive tilapia or seaweed farming
in Africa may benefit from IBMs developed through coop-
eratives and linkages to local agribusinesses, whereas
shrimp farming in southern Asia may require larger con-
tract farming models with more semi-intensive smallhold-
ers that can comply with export market standards.
Fifth, our review suggests that most of these models
require smallholders to have access to some degree of
assets, such as land, finance and/or human and social capi-
tal. Integrating farmers into capital-intensive markets with
high compliance standards, especially export markets, may
not always be the best solution for smallholders. This is
compounded further where domestic demand is high and
where food standard compliance in Europe may be difficult
to achieve for smallholders in low-income country
contexts. Our review shows evidence of smallholder
farmers actively downgrading their businesses or even opting
to outgrade from export value chains as a result. The liveli-
hoods of and potential risks borne by farmers are extremely
important points to consider. In contexts where aquaculture
is not the mainstay of smallholders’ livelihood systems (in
much of Africa, for example – see Kaminski et al. 2018), the
time, costs and efforts of moving into business arrangements
for aquaculture may take people away from cash crop
production and put their livelihoods at greater risk.
Finally, the variety of available models and the implemen-
tation modalities highlights the need to consider the socio-
economic (including gender) and cultural contexts, as well
as existing market realities and institutional frameworks.
None of the articles in this review examined the social issues
around inclusive business models. Context-specific and mul-
tidisciplinary understandings are needed to inform
approaches that aim to help smallholder farmers and
agribusiness entrepreneurs commercialize, including assess-
ing the value systems, power asymmetries and perceptions of
reality in heterogeneous contexts (Poole et al. 2013). This
means using a broad spectrum of approaches, including
business-related and social innovations, rather than only
those that are technical in nature (see Joffre et al. 2017).
Developing a more thorough conceptual framework of what
inclusive really means in the context of business models, as
well as indicators to monitor and evaluate inclusiveness
would help to apply the concept to different value chains.
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